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"The paramount goal of Superfund' is prompt cleanup of
hazardous waste sites." 2 An additional goal of Superfund is to effi-
ciently and equitably allocate response costs among responsible
parties.3 A third goal is to deter current and future releases of
hazardous substances." This article argues that the first and third
goals of Superfund should take priority over the second, and retro-
active liability for pollution caused prior to the passage of CER-
CLA should be eliminated.
Debates in the environmental arena frequently involve a clash
between self-interested regulated entities, public interest groups,
and a government attempting to look good in the face of whatever
the current political tide holds. During the current battle over
Superfund reauthorization, the lines are already being drawn. In
1994, debate over CERCLA should include an examination of the
goals of Superfund, and a prioritization of those goals.
Issues that have been the focus of early debates in the
Superfund re-authorization battle include: (1) the status of de
minimis contributors to a site;" (2) the liability of municipalities;'
* Associate, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minn.; J.D., 1992, University of Minne-
sota; B.S., 1988, Arizona State University.
' Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1992) [hereinafter CERCLA], commonly known as
"Superfund."
Superfund Reauthorization: An Opportunity to Rectify Major Problems, 24 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1024 (Oct. 1, 1993).
1 See Christopher D. Knopf, Breaking New Ground: Recovery of Transaction Costs
in Private CERCLA Cost-Recovery Actions. 28 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 495, 498 (1992).
1 See Michael A. Ohara, The Utilization of Caveat Emptor In CERCLA Private
Party Cleanups, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 151-52 (1993).
Guidances on Small Volume Contributors, Federal Liens Given to Regions by
Agency, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 587 (Aug. 6, 1993).
' Municipal Representative Sees Merit in Industry Group's Liability Proposal, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) 848 (Sept. 10, 1993).
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(3) the definition of response costs; 7 (4) the definition of cleanup
standards; 8 and (5) issues involving insurance.'
An issue at the heart of the reauthorization debate is whether
the broad net of CERCLA liability should be radically altered in
an attempt to more effectively accomplish the fundamental goal of
Superfund. This broad net currently catches a wide variety of en-
tities and holds them strictly and retroactively, as well as jointly
and severally, liable.
I. THE BASICS OF CERCLA LIABILITY
Any discussion of changes of the CERCLA liability system
should begin with at least a basic introduction to the current sys-
tem. The current liability system of CERCLA holds nearly any-
one remotely connected with a piece of property jointly and sever-
ally liable and then leaves liable parties to fight among themselves
as to the allocation of that liability based on whatever equitable
factors seem just. Such a complex system entails enormous trans-
action costs which are connected to investigation and litigation.
A. Joint and Several Liability
In nearly every Superfund case, the significance of joint and
several liability lies in the existence of the "orphan's share." The
orphan's share is that share of liability attributable to unknown
sources (such as unknown dumpers at a particular site) or finan-
cially insolvent parties. Because a Superfund site frequently in-
volves activities taking place over a long period of time or involv-
ing very little record keeping, the orphan's share of liability can be
very substantial in a given case.10
Assuming a company is in some way connected with a con-
taminated piece of property, the company likely will be held
jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs associated with that
property, and correspondingly for a portion of the orphan's
* Superfund Reauthorization: An Opportunity to Rectify Major Problems, 24 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1020 (Oct. 1, 1993).
8 Id. at 1021.
* Id. at 1021, 1024.
"O For an excellent discussion of allocation of CERCLA liability and the fight over
orphan's shares see Daniel R. Hansen, CERCLA Cost Allocation and NonParties' Respon-
sibility: Who Pays the Orphan Shares?, 11 J. ENVT'L L. 37 (1992).
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share." Although CERCLA is not explicit on the issue, courts
assume that §107 of CERCLA imposes joint and several liability
on responsible parties. 2
Courts look to common law principles in applying joint and
several liability.15 The party seeking to avoid joint and several lia-
bility may do so only if (1) there are distinct harms at the site, or
(2) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of
each cause to a single harm at the site.14 Although as a legal mat-
ter a party may be able to avoid joint and several liability, as a
practical matter making such a showing has proved to be almost
impossible."
Therefore, the traditional strategy of the EPA has been to
find a small number of Potentially Responsible Parties (PRP's),
hold them jointly and severally liable, and allow those parties to
seek out and obtain contribution from other entities connected
with the site." The EPA followed this strategy in U.S. v. Alcan
Aluminum Co.17 In Alcan, the defendant was one of twenty po-
tentially responsible parties for a cleanup effort of the Susque-
hanna River. The other nineteen potentially responsible parties
entered into a consent decree with the EPA regarding the extent
of their liability for the cleanup. Alcan refused to settle. The trial
court granted summary judgment to the government and ordered
Alcan to pay the remainder of the cleanup costs. This amounted
to over $473,000, a figure well above Alcan's actual share of con-
tribution to the site.'8 The Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded the case to the trial court with the following instructions:
We find that the court should have conducted a hearing to de-
termine the divisibility of harm to the Susquehanna River, and
" To some extent, this is an oversimplification. CERCLA does provide for certain
defenses, including the third party defense, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3), the act of God de-
fense, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1), and the act of war defense, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2). The
third party defense, which is sometimes asserted by "innocent landowners," involves intense
factual inquiries that will impose substantial legal and investigation fees on a defendant
attempting to assert such a claim.
11 See, e.g., U.S. v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
"a See, e.g., U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Co., 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3rd Cir. 1992); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 433A (1965).
' Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172.
iS See Hansen, supra note 10, at 42.
' WILLAM TUCKER. Tiis Is No WAY To SAVE THE EARTH 169, 173 (1993).
' U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Co., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 270.
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will remand the case for the court to do so. If Alcan can estab-
lish in that hearing that the harm is capable of reasonable ap-
portionment, then it should be held liable only for the response
cost relating to that portion of harm to which it contributed.
Further, if Alcan can establish that the hazardous substances in
its emulsion could not, when added to other hazardous sub-
stances, have caused or contributed to the release or the resul-
tant response costs, then it should not be liable for any of the
response costs. 9
Despite the procedural opportunity Alcan gives to a party
seeking to avoid joint and several liability, in reality Alcan pro-
vides little comfort. Companies seeking to avoid joint and several
liability must show a very strong factual basis in support of their
claim. The defendant bears the burden of proving that liability
should be apportioned. Only rarely have courts held that the de-
fendant has met this burden.2"
Courts have refused to allocate liability under §107 based on
the volume of waste dumped into a site.2 Courts have also re-
jected apportioning liability based on different stages of cleanup.22
B. Contribution Claims Between PRP's
Assuming a court imposes joint and several liability, it must
next face the issue of contribution and allocation of damages, that
is, whether each party must actually pay towards cleanup costs,
and if so, then in what amount. In determining each party's con-
tribution to cleanup, courts use equitable discretion under § 113(f)
iS Id. at 271.
25 Compare Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172 (finding defendant had failed to establish a
reasonable basis for apportioning liability) with United States v. Otati & Goss, Inc., 630 F.
Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985) (finding reasonable basis for allocation of liability).
1 O'Neal v. Picillio, 682 F. Supp. 706, 725 (D.R.I. 1988), affd, 883 F.2d 176 (1st
Cir. 1988); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
20 ONeal, 682 F. Supp. at 725. Assuming that a court is willing to allocate liability in
a given case, the next question is how such an allocation is made. Courts generally ap-
proach the allocation of liability by applying common law principles of fault. See. e.g,
Alcan, 964 F.2d at 271; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-72; see also United States v. Tyson,
No. CIV.A.84-2663, 1988 WL 7163, *2-*3 (E.D. Pa. 1988). A minority of courts allocate
liability based on equitable factors. See United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp
1249, 1256-59 (S.D. 111. 1984); Note, Contribution Under CERCLA: Judicial Treatment
after SARA, 14 COLUM. J. ENVT'L. L. 267, 271-72 (1989). Other courts have criticized this
approach, holding that equitable factors are appropriate only for apportioning damages,
not liability between defendants. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172.
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in deciding the amount each party should pay." In apportioning
liability or allocating damages between responsible parties, CER-
CLA gives courts broad discretion in making such an apportion-
ment. Section 113(f) states:
(1) Contribution. Any person may seek contribution from any
other person who is liable or potentially liable under § 9607(a)
of this title, during or following any civil action under § 9606 of
this title or under § 9607(a) under this title. Such claims shall
be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by federal law.
In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection
shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for con-
tribution in the absence of a civil action. under § 9606 or
§ 9607 of this title.
This language itself provides little guidance as to how courts
apportion liability in any particular action. Courts have concluded
that Congress intended cleanup costs to be equitably allocated
among parties according to their relative culpability rather than
any automatic equal share rule."'
An automatic pro rata of liability is inconsistent with § 113.25
In ENSCO, the court used six traditional factors (commonly
known as the Gore Factors) to allocate liability between jointly
and severally liable co-defendants:
(1) The ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribu-
tions to a discharge or release of a hazardous waste can be dis-
tinguished from those of others;
(2) The amount of hazardous waste involved;
(3) The degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(4) The degree of involvement by the parties in the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage or disposal of the hazardous
waste;
(5) The degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to
the hazardous waste concern, taking into account the character-
istics of such hazardous waste; and
23 Weyerhauser Co. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1420, 1426-27 (D. Md. 1991).
Envtl. Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1992).
2 Id. at 508; U.S. v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 571-73 (6th Cir. 1991).
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(6) The degree of cooperation by the parties with the federal,
state or local officials to prevent any harm to the public health
or the environment.
2S
This list of factors is not exhaustive. In fact, many courts
have considered other factors in allocating liability, including the
nature of any transactions transferring the property at issue,27 any
economic benefits received by a party from contaminating activ-
ity,28 and any discount of a transfer price of a piece of property in
light of likely environmental harm.,"
II. CERCLA'S EFFECT IN THE REAL WORLD
An introduction into CERCLA's liability scheme illustrates
the complexity of the issues faced by courts in allocating liability,
and, more importantly, the difficulty faced by businesses, insurers,
and government entities in predicting what a court will do in any
given case.30
The real complexity of CERCLA, however, does not come
from the legal context, but rather from the practical difficulties
inherent in conducting litigation under this liability scheme. At
the beginning of a CERCLA action, an attorney attempting to
advise a client normally has no idea what the history of a piece of
land is, and has an extremely rough estimate at best as to the
extent of cleanup costs at issue. At that point, therefore, the attor-
ney is completely unable to advise a client regarding the likely
extent of that client's liability. This problem is particularly acute
under a joint and several liability scheme where a client's poten-
tial liability includes not only its contribution to site conditions,
but also a potential share of liability for other parties' actions.
Accordingly, it is very difficult for an attorney to advise what an
26 ENSCO, 969 F.2d at 508 (citing U.S. v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249,
1256(S.D. Ill. 1984)).
"' See Smith Land and Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3rd
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989); In re Sterling Steel Treating, Inc., 94 BR
924, 931 (Bankr. Mich, 1989); BCW Ass'n. Ltd. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No.
CIV.A.86-5947, 1988 WL 102641 (E.D. PA 1988).
2 Weyerhaeuser, 771 F. Supp. at 1427.
26 Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 89; PVO Int'l, Inc. v. Drew Chem. Corp., [19 Litigation]
Envt'l. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20077, 20080 (D.N.J. June 27, 1988).
32 Authors have argued, however, that in fact CERCLA liability as applied by the
courts is very predictable. See Stagger, Saving the Forest for the Trees in CERCLA Lia-
bility, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 493 (1993).
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appropriate early settlement of the claim should be. In almost
every case, substantial investigation is a must.
From a practitioner's perspective, the first step in any litiga-
tion is to figure out what happened. The factual inquiry in all but
the most basic Superfund case is, therefore, to define the entire
history of activities on a given piece of land. An attorney should
seek to get a handle on the client's potential share of liability and
identify other entities that should be "included in the party."
Such an inquiry involves a wide ranging search for docu-
ments from parties and non-parties. This search includes all the
attendant disputes over the scope and propriety of subpoenas and
the difficulty of gleaning what actually took place on a site from
an often sparse factual record. Typically, the documentary record
is sketchy because records were not kept or entities previously
connected with a piece of property are insolvent. Further, a thor-
ough inquiry of a well-used dump site frequently involves an enor-
mous number of interviews with potential witnesses. These inter-
views may include everyone who has worked near the property, as
well as those in the neighborhood.
Complications increase exponentially because of the number
of parties involved in Superfund cases, ranging anywhere from
two to thousands of parties. Simply scheduling events can involve
extensive negotiation.
Significant complaints lodged against the Superfund liability
system include the unfairness of imposing liability on certain re-
sponsible parties and problems with enforcement policy.3 1 Two
major categories of complaints that undermine the existence of
the current system concern the extent of transaction costs associ-
ated with Superfund litigation and inequitable allocations of
cleanup costs.
A. Transaction Costs
First, and most prevalent among the many complaints re-
garding CERCLA's liability scheme, are those relating to the
amount of transaction costs (litigation and investigation expenses)
when compared to what is actually spent cleaning up a piece of
" See, e.g., Robert W. McGee, Should Superfund be Wasted? The Case to Trash the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA), II GLENDALE L REV. 120, 131-35 (1992).
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property.3 These transaction costs are born by insurance compa-
nies, potentially responsible parties, and government entities.
Insurance company expenses relating to Superfund cleanups
consist almost entirely of transaction costs. Between 1986 and
1989, insurers' spending on Superfund cases rose from an annual
average of $9 million per company to over $17 million per insur-
ance company. On the average, transaction costs have been 88
percent of total expenditures. In 1989, Rand Corporation esti-
mated that insurers spent $410 million on transaction costs.3
The Rand Corporation also studied transaction costs of very
large industrial firms, those appearing on the Fortune 100 list.
Rand Corporation estimates that transaction costs averaged 21
percent of the total outlays of each firm with respect to the sites.
However, transaction costs vary significantly by site. The Rand
Corporation analyzed the relationship between transaction cost
shares and a particular site attribute and reached the following
findings:
Transaction-cost shares are 34 percentage points lower at single
PRP sites than at multiple PRP sites when other attributes are
held fixed, and the difference is statistically significant.
Transaction-cost shares depend strongly on the stage in the
cleanup process that the site has reached. Sites further through
the process have lower shares even when other attributes are
held fixed.
The difference in transaction-cost shares at NPL and non-
NPL sites was small and not statistically significant."4
These burdens are difficult for any party involved in
Superfund litigation, but are particularly punishing on a small
business only tangentially involved with a site.3 For small poten-
tially responsible parties, transaction-cost share averages 60 per-
cent for firms having annual revenues less than $15 million, 60
percent for firms having annual revenues between $15 million and
$100 million, 15 percent for firms with annual revenues between
$100 million and $1 billion, and 19 percent for firms with annual
12 Id. at 131-33.
- JAN PAUL ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON. SUPERFUND & TRANSACTION COSTS, THE
EXPERIENCE OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS (1992).
11I d. at xiii.
31 For a description of one business's experiences with the Superfund process, see E.
Feldenthal, Mass-Liability Suits Can Trap Minor Players that Prefer to Settle, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 4, 1993, at 1.
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revenues between $1 billion and $20 billion.38 Examples of the
types of small businesses involved include donut shops and travel
agencies.3 7
The transaction costs problem is not limited to private par-
ties. The EPA is primarily responsible for enforcing Superfund.
Over 40 percent, or nearly 1,500, of the EPA Superfund staff are
lawyers or non-lawyers dedicated to implementing the Superfund's
liability system. 8
The following conclusions can be reached from this data: (1)
an inequitable portion of transaction cost burden has been placed
on small companies; and (2) a full analysis of transaction costs
relating to cleanup of sites must include an analysis of insurance
transaction costs, PRP transaction costs, and government transac-
tion costs. Transaction costs have significantly interfered with the
Superfund goal of efficient cleanup of sites.
B. Inequitable Allocation of Cleanup Costs
The second major category of complaint regarding the joint
and several liability system is that it inequitably allocates cost be-
tween responsible parties. It has been frequently stated that
Superfund does not result in the polluter paying for cleanup of
property, but rather in the deep pocket most closely associated
with the site footing the bill. 9
Other commentators have complained about the unfairness of
imposing liability for the orphan's share at any site."' Under the
current liability scheme, since PRP's are almost uniformly held
jointly and severally liable, potentially responsible parties wind up
dividing liability for the orphan's share. The method for allocating
this responsibility is usually through equitable factors."1
A third inequity with the current system is that it holds non-
polluters liable for cleanup costs. For example, a current owner is
" LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL., PRIVATE SECTOR CLEANUP EXPENDITURES AND TRANSAC-
TION COSTS AT 18 SUPERFUND SITES (1993).
"' Senator Paul Wellstone, Press Release, Wellstone Supports Bill to Protect Commu-
nities & Small Businesses, at I (May 17, 1993).
" NATIONAL ENVTL TRUST FUND, THE NETF-PUTTING CLEANUP FIRST at 2-3
(Jan. 1993) (The NETF is supported by hundreds of private citizens, businesses, and local
governments seeking reform of Superfund's retroactive liability).
" Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective on Superfund Liability
Scheme, [21 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10413, 10423 (July 1991).
O See Feldenthal, supra note 35.
" See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1420, 1426-27 (D. Md. 1991).
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a responsible party under CERCLA. Absent fraud"2 or some un-
usual circumstance in the transaction, the current owner stands a
good chance of being held liable for a significant portion of
cleanup costs.
A fourth category frequently cited as an unfair example of
liability is municipal liability for hazardous substances contained
in municipal solid waste. Studies have concluded that municipal
solid waste often contains at least some portion of hazardous sub-
stances. Lead contained in batteries or other hazardous substances
found in normal household items are examples. When the solid
waste is combined with industrial waste in a landfill, the munici-
pality is often faced with a potentially large liability for a rela-
tively small contribution to the problem.48
III. PROPOSED ALTERATIONS TO SUPERFUND LIABILITY
SCHEME
On the eve of Superfund reauthorization, various interested
parties have proposed a variety of alternatives to the current
Superfund liability scheme. The Clinton administration has indi-
cated support for an early, non-binding allocation scheme."" The
Treasury Department and a coalition of small businesses and in-
surers have proposed eliminating retroactive liability and replac-
ing that liability with a tax." Environmental groups have opposed
this proposal."'
The administration also appears to favor exemptions from lia-
bility for de minimis contributors to a site. 7 Other proposals re-
lating to small contributors have included changes in EPA de
minimis settlement policy ' and changes in the liability scheme to
allow for a pre-enforcement stay of litigation with regard to de
11 NATONAL ENVTL TRUST FUND. THE NETF-PUTTING CLEANUP FIRST at 2-3 (Jan.
1993) (The NETF is supported by hundreds of private citizens, businesses, and local gov-
ernments seeking reform of Superfund's retroactive liability).
,3 Superfund Reauthorization: An Opportunity to Rectify Major Problems, supra
note 2, at 1021-22.
" Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective on Superfund Liability
Scheme, [21 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10413, 10423 (July 1991).
" See Feldenthal, supra note 35.
" Earlier, Expanded Community Grants Urged to Increase Involvement in Cleanup
Process, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1175 (Oct. 22, 1993).
" Businesses Willing to Pay New Taxes, Fees to Support Liability Reform Witnesses
Say, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1313 (Nov. 12, 1993).
" Superfund Reauthorization: An Opportunity to Rectify Major Problems, supra
note 2, at 1023.
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minimis contributors. 9 Still other proposals include early binding
allocation procedures.5
IV. PROMPT CLEANUP OF SITES SHOULD TAKE PRIORITY OVER
ALL OTHER SUPERFUND GOALS
Congress, in choosing between these alternatives, should keep
in mind the three goals of Superfund: (1) prompt cleanup of sites;
(2) equitable allocation of cleanup costs; and (3) deterrence of fu-
ture conduct. 51 A careful analysis of these goals reveals that the
current system works well with respect to the deterrence of future
activity, but with respect to retroactive liability, the goal of
prompt cleanup clashes with the goal of equitable allocation.
A. The Current Scheme Is Satisfactory with Respect to Current
Liability
A positive effect of the current scheme is that it deters cur-
rent improper disposal of hazardous substances. Companies have
painfully learned the problems that can arise if they fail to ensure
that hazardous substances are handled properly. Furthermore, in-
vestigation costs associated with allocation are not as great with
respect to current activity. RCRA reporting requirements, as well
as a general awareness of hazardous substance regulation, make
far more information available regarding the handling of hazard-
ous substances during that time period.
Accordingly, the goal of prompt cleanup of property is hin-
dered much less in a case involving modern activity. The current
liability scheme also serves to prevent future conduct. Thus, with
respect to present and future activities, the current liability
scheme is satisfactory.
" Guidances on Small Volume Contributors. Federal Liens Given to Regions by
Agency, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 587 (Aug. 6, 1993).
" Binding Allocation System Supported By National Commission on Superfund, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1563-64 (Dec. 31, 1993),
" See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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B. Prompt Cleanup of Sites Should Take Priority Over Retro-
active Allocation of Liability
With respect to retroactive liability, any allocation scheme is
fundamentally inconsistent with the goal of prompt cleanup."
When an allocation takes place, an attorney advising a responsible
party will have to conduct an investigation by pulling together the
history of the site and attributing soil conditions to past activities
on the site. Experience has shown that any allocation of
Superfund liability involves a painstaking, expensive, slow-moving
process.
Additionally, the mere use of resources for purposes other
than cleanup invites delay. If the EPA employees now involved in
implementing the liability system were instead involved in
cleanup, the result would be a more efficient process. Similarly, in
a private action, if a party is able to clean up a property without
searching for the wrongdoer, the result will be an expedited, more
efficient process.
Thus, the current system has been criticized for promoting
adversarial negotiating postures and litigation. 3 The current sys-
tem has also been accused of discouraging voluntary cleanups and
rewarding deception and stalling by potentially responsible
parties."
Proposals to make the Superfund allocation process more effi-
cient either through allocation or through changes in the liability
scheme will fail to alter this basic problem. The factual investiga-
tion will be required regardless, and the inadequate factual record
will always exist. The result will almost always be an expensive,
drawn-out process.
If one accepts the proposition that equitable allocation and
prompt cleanup are fundamental opposites, the next issue is which
goal should take priority. The goal of prompt cleanup of property
clearly should prevail. First, cleaning up the environment is ulti-
mately a major goal of any environmental regulation. Although
allocating fault for the problem may be desirable from a "re-
venge" or justice standpoint, the desirability of that goal pales in
5. For a full discussion of this issue see Study by Former Top Agency Official Says
Fair, Efficient Cleanups Impossible, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1209 (Oct. 29, 1993)(discussing






comparison to the fundamental importance of cleaning up
property.
Second, the "polluter pays" goal has not been effectively ac-
complished under the current scheme. Solvent companies with
partial responsibility for conditions existing at huge sites have
been coerced through the specter of joint and several liability to
pay in excess of their responsibility. Furthermore, the government
has been forced to commit vast administrative and judicial re-
sources to the allocation process. Finally, the complicated nature
of the Superfund allocation process has strangled small businesses,
causing them to pay far in excess of their fault, either to attorneys
or through settlement.
Another advantage of eliminating an allocation process is
that it reduces uncertainty on the part of municipalities, insurance
companies, and businesses as to future Superfund liability for yet
undiscovered problems.
The allegations of a "Polluters Amnesty Program" against
the current system are not accurate.55 Such allegations imply a
moral basis for Superfund liability. While such allegations have a
legitimate basis in certain instances, frequently parties involved
with Superfund acted entirely within the bounds of the law as it
existed at that time. Parties held liable are often not the polluters
themselves, but parties in some way connected with the property
at the time the pollution took place. The moral basis for CER-
CLA liability, therefore, diminishes as one goes back in time.
Current loss is shifted to insurers and non-polluters. Solvency be-
comes as important an issue as pollution.
CONCLUSION
Because the goals of prompt cleanup of sites and equitable
allocation of liability are incompatible in a retroactive CERCLA
liability scheme, debates over Superfund reauthorization should
include a discussion of the relative importance of these two goals.
The result of such a debate should be to prioritize prompt cleanup
of property over equitable allocation of liability.
" Insurance Group Backs Treasury Proposal. Is Willing to Pay $300 Million Annual
Share, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1175-76 (Oct. 22, 1993).
1993-94]

